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FLAG ON THE PLAY: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS
CALLING TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
ON THEIR SUPERFANS
I. INTRODUCTION
Sports fans that come decked out in their favorite team’s colors
and hold signs in support of their team are constant fixtures on
game day.1  These die-hard fans stand in the bleachers cheering on
their team from the first play until the game clock expires.2  Sports
teams frequently entice these fans to attend games by offering free
souvenirs for the first fans through the gates.3  Moreover, multiple
sports teams encourage their “superfans” to stay actively involved by
running contests that reward superfans for their knowledge and
love of their team.4  In recent years, however, some superfans have
taken their love for their team one step further, causing a stir
amongst sports team trademark holders.5  Superfans opting to
profit off of their favorite sports team by marketing their own prod-
1. See Madison Gray, Why Are NBA Fans Showing Up To Games Wearing One
Color?, TIME NEWSFEED (May 12, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/05/12/
why-are-nba-fans-showing-up-to-games-wearing-one-color/ (stating NBA fans have
borrowed college football fans’ tradition of wearing their team’s colors on game
day).
2. See David Luther, College Football Rankings 2012: The 20 Rowdiest Stadiums in
the Nation, BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 5, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1090935-college-football-rankings-2012-the-20-rowdiest-stadiums-in-the-nation/
page/11 (noting Texas A&M fans yell and stand throughout their team’s entire
game).
3. See Atlanta Braves 2012 Promotional Calendar Includes Fireworks, Live Music,
Kids Run the Bases, Alumni Autographs, Bobbleheads, and Great Savings All Season, AT-
LANTA BRAVES (Mar. 28, 2012), http://atlanta.braves.mlb.com/news/print.jsp?ymd
=20120328&content_id=27700086&vkey=pr_atl&c_id=atl (listing promotional pro-
grams Atlanta Braves have in place for 2012 MLB season).
4. See Steelers Name New Mascot ‘Steely McBeam’, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
(Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/breaking/steelers-
name-new-mascot-steely-mcbeam-496394/  (stating fan’s submission for name of
Steelers’ mascot was chosen out of over 70,000 entries, and fan was awarded VIP
package to Steelers home game).
5. See Melvin N.A. Avanzado, Entertainment & Sports Litigation: Los Angeles Clip-
pers Assert Trademark Rights Against Clipper Darrell, ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION BLOG
(Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.avanzadolaw.com/component/content/article/1-
blog/30-clipper-darrell.html (detailing Clippers organization’s reaction to
superfan making public appearances stemming from fan’s love for team).
(631)
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ucts and attending publicity events have led some trademark hold-
ers to seek legal action.6
One superfan who has not only become a household name in
the Los Angeles area, but is also the most recent fan accused of
trademark infringement, is Darrell Bailey.7  For the past fifteen sea-
sons of the L.A. Clippers, Darrell Bailey, also known as “Clipper
Darrell,” has attended over 350 consecutive home games while don-
ning his signature red and blue suit.8  The Clippers initially sup-
ported Darrell’s love for his team, even including him in the
Clippers’ official NBA website.9  In the last year, however, the Clip-
pers have had a change of heart, asking Darrell to drop the “Clip-
per” from his name and to stop selling products relating to the
team.10  In response to the Clippers’ requests, both fans as well as
Clippers players have expressed their continued support for Clip-
per Darrell.11  This presents two issues: what legal actions are availa-
ble to the Clippers, and is it advantageous for a team to press
charges against one of their most beloved fans?
This Comment begins by exploring the legal ramifications of a
superfan “capitalizing” off of his or her team’s popularity.  Part II of
this Comment examines the history and background of trademark
law, focusing on the Lanham Act’s provisions.12  Part III discusses
the causes of action that professional sports leagues have against
superfans who profit without authorization from the team’s trade-
6. See id. (stating Clippers have opted to deny fan’s use of “Clipper” before his
first name).
7.  See id. (noting Los Angeles Clippers are protecting their trademark against
infringement by their superfan, Darrell Bailey).
8. See Alissa Abril, Clippers Cut Clipper Darrell, SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT L.
BLOG (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.sportsandentertainmentlawblog.com/2012/03/
clippers-cut-clipper-darrell/ (noting Darrell has been “Clippers’ biggest supporter”
for fifteen seasons and has held season tickets for over ten years, attending games
even while Clippers constantly lost).
9. See Avanzado, supra note 5 (stating Clippers’ official site contains biography R
of “Clipper Darrell”).
10. See Dan Woike, Clippers Statement Regarding Clipper Darrell, ORANGE CNTY.
REGISTER CLIPPERS BLOG (Feb. 29, 2012), http://clippers.ocregister.com/2012/
02/29/clippers-statement-regarding-clipper-darrell/ (“We hold all of our fans in
the highest esteem and we have been patient and generous with Mr. Bailey.  He
has not returned our support in an honorable way.  He is not actually a fan of the
Clippers, but a fan of what he can make off of the Clippers.”).
11. See Avanzado, supra note 5 (noting one player who tweeted “Bring back R
#Clipper Darrell,” while another player tweeted to Darrell, “WE GOT YOU!!”).
12. For a general discussion of the history of trademark law and background
to the current state of the law, see infra notes 16-87 and accompanying text. R
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mark holders.13  Part IV sets forth possible defenses the superfan
has in response to allegations of trademark infringement.14  Finally,
Part V suggests that while sports teams will frequently prevail in liti-
gation brought against superfans, the costs imposed by bringing le-
gal actions against their fans will outweigh any benefit the teams
receive.15
II. THE HISTORY OF TRADEMARK LAW AND THE ADVENT OF
THE LANHAM ACT
Trademark law functions to protect both consumers and pro-
ducers.16  Trademark law was initially established to prevent con-
sumer confusion as to the source of goods by labeling goods “as the
product of a particular trader.”17  As a corollary, trademark laws en-
courage producers to invest in their own products, as they will reap
all benefits from such investment.18  Producers also receive protec-
tion from possible economic loss that would otherwise result in
others trying to pass off the mark holder’s goods as their own.19
Property rights afforded to mark holders are not intended to be
expansive, only prohibiting use of the mark that deprives the mark
holders “of sales which they otherwise might have made.”20  Conse-
quently, trademark law promotes economic efficiency by reducing
consumer costs in identifying the product quality they want while
providing an incentive to producers to create desirable goods.21
13. For a general discussion on the causes of action that mark holders have
against superfans that use their mark for profit, see infra notes 88-139 and accom- R
panying text.
14. For a general discussion of the defenses that the superfan has against
claims of trademark infringement, see infra notes 140-172 and accompanying text. R
15. For a general discussion of the interests of both superfans and sports
teams and how these two competing interests should be properly balanced, see
infra notes 173-238 and accompanying text. R
16. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 (1992) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946)) (noting purpose of
trademark law is primarily to protect consumers and also producers).
17. See David Franklin, League Parity: Bringing Back Unlicensed Competition in the
Sports Fan Apparel Market, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 989 (2011) (noting trademark
law developed primarily to prevent consumer confusion).
18. See Michael C. Shull, Comment, Biting the Hand That Feeds: How Trademark
Protection Might Threaten School Spirit, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 641, 642 (2011) (stat-
ing that trademark owners are protected against unauthorized uses of their mark
thus, protecting their “reputation in the marketplace”).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (listing protections afforded to producers
against those who try to profit from another’s investment).
20. See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510,
513 (7th Cir. 1912) (discussing property rights of mark holders).
21. See Joshua Saltzman, Smack Apparel, College Color Schemes and the Muddying
of Trademark Law, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1635, 1639-40 (2011) (noting economic effi-
3
Adams: Flag on the Play: Professional Sports Teams Calling Trademark Inf
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS210.txt unknown Seq: 4  7-JUN-13 11:31
634 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 631
Although trademark law protects consumers and producers, its
primary focus is consumer interests.22  Mark protection is only
awarded to producers to the extent that the mark is acting as a
source identifier to consumers.23  In addition to promoting well-
informed consumers, trademark law encourages competition.24  In-
creased competition in the marketplace pushes the price of mer-
chandise down while giving consumers a wider selection of goods
for purchase.25  The consumer-focused competition aims of trade-
mark law reinforce the idea that mark holders are not intended to
have unlimited property rights.26
The current state of trademark law is laid out in the Lanham
Act of 1946.27  The Lanham Act did not change the foundations of
trademark law, but merely codified prior common law interpreta-
tions.28  Under the Lanham Act, trademark holders can bring in-
fringement actions via two different provisions.29  First, under
section 1114, trademark holders are protected when another’s use
of the registered mark is “likely to cause confusion.”30  Second,
ciency function of trademark law); see also J. Steven Gardner, Note, Trademark In-
fringement, Likelihood of Confusion, and Trademark Parody: Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L
& L Wings, Inc., 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 714 (1993) (stating consumers asso-
ciate trademarks with certain qualities).
22. See Mark A. Kahn, May The Best Merchant Win: The Law of Non-Trademark
Uses of Sports Logos, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 283, 285 (2004) (emphasizing trade-
mark law as “a consumer protection law”).
23. See id. (stating when marks are not functioning as source identifiers they
are not afforded protection).
24. See Stephanie Frank, Showing Your School Spirit: Why University Color Schemes
and Indicia Do Not Deserve Trademark Protection, 92 B.U. L. REV. 329, 345 (2012)
(stating endgame of trademark law is to promote competition).
25. See Matthew J. Mitten, From Dallas Cap To American Needle and Beyond: Anti-
trust Law’s Limited Capacity to Stitch Consumer Monopolies, 86 TUL. L. REV. 901, 928
(2012) (noting existence of monopolies in marketplace pushes price of goods up
for consumers).
26. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1694 (1999) (rejecting idea that trademark owners are in-
tended to have property rights in their marks).
27. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2012) (discussing United States trademark
law).
28. See Kahn, supra note 22, at 284 (noting Lanham Act codified prior com- R
mon law trademark protections).
29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)-1125(a) (discussing who has standing in trade-
mark action).
30. See id. § 1114(1) (“Any person who shall, without the consent of the regis-
trant – (a) use in commerce any reproduction . . . or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale . . . with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) . . . or colorably imitate
a registered mark . . . in connection with which such use is likely to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.”).
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under section 1125(a), a trademark holder’s registered or unregis-
tered mark is protected when another’s use of the mark is “decep-
tive,” or, “is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of” the mark’s origin.31  To state a success-
ful trademark infringement action under either provision, the mark
holder needs to show: (1) distinctiveness of the mark, (2) likeli-
hood of confusion, and (3) that the use of the mark does not in-
fringe on a functional feature.32
A. The Early Years of the Lanham Act
Initially, the Lanham Act sought to benefit consumers by em-
phasizing the likelihood of consumer confusion in trademark in-
fringement actions.33  Over the years, however, trademark law
evolved, shifting the focus to benefitting producers.34  This shift was
due to trademark holders’ increased belief that they held a prop-
erty interest in their mark, as well as the advent of licensing agree-
ments.35  Compounding the problem, courts have continually
relaxed the requirements of trademark infringement actions, en-
31. See id. § 1125(a) (“Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact . . . which –  (A) is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”).
32. See, e.g., Shull, supra note 18, at 643 (listing requirements that trademark R
owners must meet to prove trademark infringement).  For a further discussion on
the elements of a trademark infringement action, see infra notes 88-139 and ac- R
companying text.
33. See Mitten, supra note 25, at 905 (noting traditional rationale for trade- R
mark law was “to facilitate consumers’ ability to identify desired goods and services
having a consistent level of quality and to reduce their search costs by relying upon
a trademark or service mark as an indicia or origin or source of particular brand of
goods or services”).
34. See Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that “certain knowledge of the buyer that the
source and origin of the trademark symbols” were plaintiff’s satisfied Lanham Act’s
requirement, essentially eliminating likelihood of confusion element); see also
Frank, supra note 24, at 334 (noting Boston Professional Hockey essentially held R
defendant liable for intentionally copying plaintiff’s mark irrespective of con-
sumer’s actual confusion).
35. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 993 (noting trademark protection began to R
change when companies started to use their marks not just as source indicators,
but also as products in themselves, especially in fan apparel); see also id. (stating
change in public perception of “a product’s ‘source’ changed as licensing agree-
ments became commonplace” contributing to expanded scope of trademark law).
5
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couraging trademark holders to bring legal actions against their
most avid fans.36
Beginning in the 1970s, courts began to expand trademark
protection afforded to athletic marks.37  The first major case to ex-
pand protection of a trademark holder’s rights and effectively move
away from the central purpose of the Lanham Act, was Boston Profes-
sional Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing Inc.38
The court reasoned that the likelihood of confusion requirement
was met when a manufacturer other than the team used the mark
because the public was likely to identify the mark as being associ-
ated with the team.39  The ruling essentially exposed any manufac-
turer to liability for using a team’s mark, regardless of a consumer’s
actual perception of the mark’s source.40  This represents a depar-
ture from the previous belief that the purpose of the Lanham Act’s
likelihood of confusion requirement was to ensure consumer
awareness of the registered mark’s source and origin.41
Scholars have criticized the holding in Boston Professional Hockey
as misapplying the goals of trademark law.42  These scholars empha-
36. See Jeremy Kahn, School Spirit; Rah, Rah, Rah (It’s Protected), N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2007, at 4A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/07/education/ed-
life/07colors.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 (chronicling trend of university trade-
mark holders in bringing litigation to protect their mark); see also NFL Claims
Trademark Infringement, ASSOCIATED PRESS,Jan. 30, 2010, available at http://sports.
espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2009/news/story?id=4871697 (stating NFL sent T-shirt
makers cease-and-desist letters asking they stop selling shirts displaying cheer of
New Orleans Saints fans).
37. See Kahn, supra note 22, at 303 (noting court extended trademark protec- R
tion in order to benefit trademark owner).
38. See Bos. Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1011 (acknowledging decision “may
slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting the public to the
protection of the business interests of plaintiffs” but viewing two aforementioned
interests as intertwined). Id. at 1008.  Here, plaintiffs, who played professional ice
hockey, acquired trademark protection in their team symbols. Id. at 1009.  De-
fendants who made and sold embroidered cloth emblems unsuccessfully at-
tempted to enter into a licensing agreement with the plaintiffs to use their team
“motifs.” Id.  Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants after they reproduced the
plaintiffs’ team marks on embroidered emblems, despite the unsuccessful negotia-
tions. Id.
39. See id. at 1012 (“The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact
that the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the pub-
lic knowing that the public would identify them as being the teams’ trademarks.
The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark
symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act.”).
40. See id. (rejecting District Court’s focus on source of manufacture, which
Fifth Circuit held was eliminated when Lanham Act was amended, and instead
stated confusion relates to where consumers believe mark originated).
41. For a further discussion of the initial consumer-focused interpretation of
trademark law, see supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. R
42. See Kahn, supra note 22, at 302-03 (stating likelihood of confusion analysis R
should not even apply to situations like Boston Professional Hockey, where logo was
6
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size that the fundamental aim of trademark law is consumer assur-
ance as to the quality of goods in the marketplace, not the creation
of a property right in the mark.43 Critics argue the emblems at issue
did not indicate the quality of the merchandise, and thus the mark
was not serving the traditional function of a trademark, which is to
reduce research costs for consumers.44  Despite the ongoing criti-
cism of Boston Professional Hockey, courts have continually applied
the case’s line of reasoning.45
Even though most courts continued to expand protections af-
forded to mark holders under the Lanham Act, one District Court
held that use of a university’s insignia was unlikely to cause confu-
sion and, therefore, the court did not grant trademark protection.46
In University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., the University of
Pittsburgh argued that use of the school’s name and insignia on
apparel and other items constituted trademark infringement, war-
ranting protection.47  The District Court held the insignia was un-
likely to cause confusion because the defendant indicated that it
was the actual source.48  Moreover, there was no evidence indicat-
not being used to provide consumers with assurance of underlying product’s qual-
ity); John J. Voortman, Trademark Licensing of Names, Insignia, Characters and De-
signs: The Current Status of the Boston Pro Hockey Per Se Infringement Rule, 22 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 575-79 (1989) (stating Boston Professional Hockey created “the
per se infringement rule,” which was inconsistent with precedent and traditional
trademark rights).
43. See Voortman, supra note 43, at 578 (advocating that per se infringement R
rule created in Boston Professional Hockey effectively “separate[d] confusion from
the consumer’s motivation for buying the product depriv[ing] the ‘confusion’ re-
quirement of Section 32 of the Lanham Act of its principal if not its only policy
significance.”); Kahn, supra note 22, at 303-04 (stating “trademark law exists for the R
benefit of consumers” and while trademark owners derive benefits from owning
marks, these benefits are “secondary in terms of the goals of trademark law.”).
44. See Kahn, supra note 22, at 303-04 (arguing emblems did not signify level R
of quality and thus were not deserving of trademark protection).
45. See Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546 (11th Cir.
1985) (applying likelihood of confusion analysis but stating confusion does not
need to pertain to product’s origin); see also Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ.
Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 483 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding likelihood of confusion without examining whether consumers were actu-
ally confused as to source or origin of products).
46. See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 719
(W.D. Pa. 1983) (rejecting suggestion in Boston Professional Hockey that trademark
holders “had a property interest in its trademark distinct from the prevention of
consumer confusion” and finding “it is not the province of the courts to create a
property right in gross out of legislation intended solely to protect the consuming
public and ethical businessmen from the depredations of manufacturers of coun-
terfeit or deceptive products.”).
47. See id. at 713 (stating that for over forty years, Champion sold goods bear-
ing Pitt’s insignia to entities not affiliated with Pitt).
48. See id. at 720 (indicating products clearly bore mark made by Champion).
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ing that the defendant had tried to deceive customers into thinking
the mark holder had actually produced the merchandise.49  Despite
the court’s retreat from the producer-focused reasoning in Boston
Professional Hockey, other courts did not follow suit.50
B. Continued Expansion of Trademark Law and Increasing
Cases of Infringement in the Professional
Sports Context
Beginning in the 1980s, the majority of sports trademark in-
fringement cases involved unlicensed uses of a protected mark by
those who are in the business of producing sports apparel.51  In
Heisman Trophy Trust v. Smack Apparel Co., the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered the infring-
ing use of an organization’s mark by an unlicensed manufacturer.52
In that case, an unlicensed manufacturer produced sports mer-
chandise bearing a resemblance to the organization’s potential
Heisman Trophy winners.53  In finding an infringing use, the court
rejected the defendant’s argument that consumers knew the mer-
chandise the defendant was producing was unlicensed and that
therefore consumers were not confused as to the source of the
goods.54  Consequently, this decision placed little emphasis on con-
sumers’ likelihood of confusion, making it unlikely that any unli-
censed use of a team’s mark would subsequently be allowed.55
In granting protection against unlicensed uses of teams’ marks,
courts have based their reasoning on increased consumer expecta-
49. See id. at 722 (finding that Pitt’s insignia was only being used for decora-
tive purposes, without any intent or likelihood of confusing consumers).
50. For a further discussion of the continued departure from a consumer-
focused approach to the Lanham Act, see infra notes 122-124 and accompanying R
text.
51. See Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1300 (D. Kan. 2008)
(finding unlicensed manufacturer who sold t-shirts bearing phrases such as “Kan-
sas Swim Team” constituted trademark infringement); see also Tex. Tech Univ. v.
Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 523 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that retailer’s sale
of sports apparel bearing Texas Tech’s insignia constituted trademark
infringement).
52. See Heisman Trophy Trust v. Smack Apparel Co., 637 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (detailing infringing use by unlicensed clothing manufacturer that
primarily sold to retailers).
53. See id. (stating suit was prompted by defendant producing “thirteen vari-
eties of Heisman Trophy-related T-shirts.”).
54. See id. at 157 (noting defendant argued that media publicity created pub-
lic awareness that they were unlicensed manufacturers, which reduced likelihood
of confusion).
55. See id. at 157-58 (rejecting defendant’s argument that they incorporated
their own logo and put disclaimers on t-shirts in question, stating that this defense
has “limited” value).
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tions regarding licensing agreements.56  Over the years, as teams
started to treat their marks as property rights and aggressively assert
their power, consumers began to assume that teams sponsored all
fan apparel.57  Since consumer beliefs as to the source of a mark
directly impacts likelihood of confusion, teams have been granted
protection of their fan apparel as a result of consumers’ changed
perceptions.58
Many scholars have argued this broadening of trademark pro-
tection raises a problem of circularity.59  These scholars emphasize
that if consumers think one needs a licensing agreement to pro-
duce team merchandise, trademark law will then have to require
such authorization.60  Accordingly, these scholars argue the courts
should stick to the legal principles of trademark law that do not
require a licensing agreement.61
Despite the fact that this protection is not based on legal doc-
trine, others argue the outcome is nevertheless consistent with the
principles of trademark law.62  Proponents of extending protection
against unlicensed uses highlight the fact that consumer perception
still creates a likelihood of confusion when the team’s logo is used
in the absence of a licensing agreement.63  Presently courts’ accept-
56. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 996 (stating that for example, when con- R
sumers see merchandise bearing CUBS logo today, they presume team gave dis-
tributor their permission).
57. See Saltzman, supra note 21, at 1653 (noting increase in licensing has R
caused consumers to perceive team logos as functioning as seals of approval).
58. See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 1989) (find-
ing in regards to unlicensed use of organization’s that mark confusion was likely).
This holding was based on the fact that the shirts in question referred to the Bos-
ton Marathon and consumers were likely to purchase the shirts because of this
reference. See id.  The court reasoned that consumers were likely to be confused as
to shirt’s sponsorship, assuming the defendant’s shirts were connected with the
mark holder. See id.
59. See Saltzman, supra note 21, at 1652 (describing “problem of circularity”); R
see also 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:3, at 170 (2d
ed. 1984) (“If consumers think that most uses of a trademark require authoriza-
tion, then in fact they will require authorization . . . .  And if owners can sue to stop
unauthorized uses, then only authorized uses will be seen by consumers, creating
or reinforcing the perception that authorization is necessary.”).
60. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 489 (2005) (rejecting adherence to
circular argument, stating “the fact that consumers may believe trademark owners
have a right to control merchandise bearing their brands does not itself justify a
merchandising right.” ).
61. See id. (stating courts should not keep “a bad law intact” but rather they
should adhere to “a limited, likelihood-of-confusion rationale.”).
62. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 997 (noting under trademark law consumer R
perception creates likelihood of confusion which in turn creates “the law” as to
which uses of marks will require permission).
63. See id. (describing reason courts should adhere to circular reasoning).
9
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ance of this circular reasoning has resulted in teams possessing a
monopoly over fan apparel.64  Thus, superfans who have not en-
tered into licensing agreements will be barred from marketing any
desirable sports merchandise.65
Beginning in the twenty-first century, trademark holders in the
sports industry have increasingly brought legal actions against the
use of their team’s mark.66  This increase in litigation was partially
due to the further extension of trademark protection to include
protection of color schemes.67  In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co., the Supreme Court held that in some circumstances color
alone is entitled to trademark protection.68  In Qualitex, the plaintiff
was granted trademark protection for the green-gold color of its
dry-cleaning pads because the color allowed consumers to identify
the source of the goods.69  In recent years, courts have followed the
reasoning in Qualitex, which held that where the mark’s color serves
“as a symbol that distinguished a firm’s goods and identifies their
source, without serving any other significant function,” color alone
is enough to receive trademark protection.70  In other words, for
trademark owners to receive protection just for the color of their
marks, the marks need only attain secondary meaning.71
During the late 2000s, the courts took trademark protection
one step further in Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University
Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Smack Apparel Co.72  The Fifth
Circuit in Smack Apparel held that where a mark’s color has achieved
secondary meaning and therefore identifies the mark’s source, the
color can also receive protection when combined with “other iden-
64. See id. (stating professional sports teams have gained complete monopoly
over fan apparel).
65. See id. at 998 (noting “unlicensed fan apparel is completely barred from
the marketplace”).
66. See Frank, supra note 24, at 338 (describing dramatic increase in college R
sports litigation in mid-2000s).
67. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 476 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that retailer violated Lan-
ham Act by selling t-shirts with school’s color schemes, logos, and designs).
68. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (finding
color meets basic legal requirements for trademark protection).
69. See id. (stating green-gold press color serves no other function but to act as
symbol for identifying source of pads).
70. See id. at 166 (expressing when color alone can warrant trademark
protection).
71. For a further discussion of secondary meaning, see infra notes 96-99 and R
accompanying text.
72. 550 F.3d at 465; see Saltzman, supra note 21, at 1646 (noting Smack Apparel R
departed from previous trademark cases).
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tifying indicia.”73  While allowing protection for color plus identify-
ing indicia, the court did not indicate what types of formulations
fall into this protected category.74  Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s novel
decision may protect “indicia” that is not a defined mark.75
Despite the trend to offer protection to color schemes, the
Fifth Circuit’s extension of trademark law in Smack Apparel does not
comply with the purpose of the Lanham Act.76  Similar to Boston
Professional Hockey, the Smack Apparel decision gives teams the right
to control all uses of their mark, ignoring the Lanham Act’s goal of
protecting consumers.77  Incidentally, this expansion has substan-
tially restricted the superfan’s ability to market merchandise bear-
ing his or her team’s colors.78  It is unclear the extent to which
superfans will be able to successfully use their teams’ color schemes
due to the lack of a bright-line test in identifying “other-identifying-
indicia.”79  Moreover, since the boundaries of “other-identifying-in-
dicia” are unclear, superfans risk unintentionally committing trade-
mark infringement when using colors; thus, superfans are unlikely
to even attempt to incorporate their teams’ colors.80
Even though trademark protection has significantly expanded
over the past several years, there has been no litigation involving
individual superfans.81  The main reason for the lack of cases
73. See Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 471 (holding “t-shirts with the schools’ color
schemes and other identifying indicia referencing the games of the schools’ foot-
ball teams” constituted trademark infringement).
74. See Saltzman, supra note 21, at 1647 (noting court in Smack Apparel failed R
to define “other-identifying-indicia”).
75. See id. (stating “color plus other identifying indicia” does not “constitute a
mark at all”).
76. See id. at 1653 (discussing improbability of consumers associating color
scheme with one source; therefore, likelihood of confusion element of Lanham
Act is not met).
77. For a further discussion on the Lanham Act’s focus on consumers, see
supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. R
78. See Texas Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 520 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (holding use of team’s scarlet and black color scheme bearing “a Double T”
constituted trademark infringement).
79. See Saltzman, supra note 21, at 1649 (emphasizing lack of boundaries in R
defining what constitutes “color-plus-other-identifying-indicia”).
80. See id. at 1649-50 (noting confusion regarding what constitutes infringing
use).  After the Fifth Circuit ruled against Smack Apparel, some of the shirts pro-
duced by the company referencing college teams remained on their website, while
other shirts referencing the teams were taken down, making it unclear what consti-
tutes an infringing use. See id.
81. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 472 (5th Cir. 2008) (involving large business conducted
to market sports apparel from numerous teams).
11
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against superfans is due to “strike suits.”82  Strike suits occur when
trademark holders send cease-and-desist letters, followed by merit-
less trademark infringement filings.83  Trademark holders pursue
these actions primarily to hinder the ability of others to enter the
sports merchandise market.84  Generally, these actions are enough
to prevent small competitors, such as superfans, from continuing to
produce their products due to the risk of enduring costly lawsuits.85
Ultimately, it is the consumer who is hurt by strike suits due to
fewer options in the marketplace.86  Even though strike suits have
curtailed litigation against superfans, it is only a matter of time
before a brazen superfan ignores these trademark holder’s tactics.87
III. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES’ CAUSES OF ACTION
AGAINST THE SUPERFAN
While the scope of trademark law has varied over the years, the
basic requirements of invoking trademark protection under the
Lanham Act have remained the same.88  In order to establish trade-
mark infringement, the trademark owner must show three things:
(1) the mark must be distinctive, (2) use of the mark must be likely
to cause consumer confusion, and (3) use of the mark is not in-
fringing on a functional feature.89
A. Mark Distinctiveness
In determining whether the sports team’s mark is distinctive, a
court must decide what type of mark the holder possesses.90  There
82. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585, 589 (2008) (detailing prevalence of strike suits).
83. See id. (noting that if these suits were pursued, they would likely fail be-
cause they are frequently based on unmeritorious claims).
84. See id. (noting objective of trademark holders is not merely to stop use of
mark,  but rather to raise costs of market entrance).
85. See Port, supra note 82, at 589 (noting trademark holders send thousands R
of cease-and-desist letters, which are almost never prosecuted).  For a further dis-
cussion regarding cease-and-desist letters’ power to eliminate superfans from the
marketplace, see infra notes 182-185 and accompanying text. R
86. See Mitten, supra note 25, at 928 (noting fewer available consumer choices R
results in higher retail prices).
87. See NFL Claims Trademark Infringement, supra note 36 (reporting on New R
Orleans Saints fans who plan to continue to sell t-shirts bearing team’s insignia
even though they have received cease-and-desist letters).
88. For a further discussion concerning the evolution of trademark law, see
supra notes 33-87 and accompanying text. R
89. See Shull, supra note 19, at 643 (listing requirements that trademark own- R
ers must meet to prove trademark infringement).
90. See id. (noting that to determine whether trademark infringement has
been committed, courts must first determine distinctiveness of mark).
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are four types of marks currently recognized by the courts: generic,
arbitrary or fanciful, suggestive, and descriptive.91
1. Generic Marks
Generic marks receive the least protection because they simply
denote the particular class of which the product is a member.92
Courts always rule that these types of marks lack distinctiveness.93
Once a mark is classified as generic, it does not receive trademark
protection.94
2. Descriptive Marks
Descriptive marks are afforded slightly more protection than
generic marks.95  Unlike generic marks, descriptive marks describe
a feature of the product and acquire trademark protection when
the mark achieves secondary meaning.96  A mark achieves secon-
dary meaning when, over time, a descriptive term acquires a mean-
ing associated with the product.97  Sports teams’ colors and slogans
used by superfans for profit will likely fall into this category.98  For
instance, if a consumer who sees a team’s colors or slogan automati-
cally identifies the team as the source, the mark has the requisite
distinctiveness required for trademark protection.99
91. See id. at 644 (listing four categories of marks).
92. See Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. San Giacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363,
369 (4th Cir. 1999) (“A generic mark refers to the genus or class of which a partic-
ular product is a member and can never be protected.”).
93. See Jeremiah Kline, Comment, Black and Blue: An Examination of Trademark
University Color Schemes, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 47, 49 (2009) (stating generic marks lack
distinctiveness).
94. See id. (stating generic marks are never protected).
95. See Kline, supra note 93, at 49 (noting in terms of level of protection, de- R
scriptive marks are awarded more protection than generic marks).
96. See Ashley Furniture, 187 F.3d at 369 (“A descriptive mark describes a char-
acteristic of a product and can only be protected if it has acquired secondary
meaning.”).
97. See id. (noting descriptive marks acquire secondary meaning when they
“become distinctive of the maker’s goods over time”).
98. See Shull, supra note 19, at 646 (noting that university logos, color R
schemes, and other indicia are normally considered to be descriptive marks).
99. See Kline, supra note 93, at 53 (stating that “[w]hen a mark triggers an idea R
in the buyer’s mind that the product comes from a particular source based on that
mark and that mark alone, the mark satisfies the distinctiveness requirement of
secondary meaning”).
13
Adams: Flag on the Play: Professional Sports Teams Calling Trademark Inf
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS210.txt unknown Seq: 14  7-JUN-13 11:31
644 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 631
3. Suggestive Marks
Unlike descriptive marks, suggestive marks receive automatic
protection under the Lanham Act.100  In practice, descriptive and
suggestive marks are often confused; thus, courts have developed a
three-part test to distinguish a suggestive mark from a descriptive
mark.101  The test for suggestive marks requires that (1) consumers
link the mark to some characteristic of the product, (2) competi-
tors use the term as a trademark, and (3) the proposed use of the
mark does not prevent competitors from describing their own
goods.102
4. Arbitrary or Fanciful Marks
While arbitrary and fanciful marks are grouped together by the
courts, the two differ in regard to the types of goods they protect.103
While a mark is classified as arbitrary when the mark “is well-known
in a different context,” fanciful marks relate to items that are “newly
invented.”104  Both arbitrary and fanciful marks also receive auto-
matic trademark protection.105
B. Likelihood of Confusion
To bring a successful trademark infringement claim against a
superfan, the mark holder will also need to show that “the infringed
use will likely cause consumer confusion.”106  Although each circuit
applies its own likelihood of confusion test, there are eight factors
100. See Menashe v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 412, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating suggestive marks automatically receive trademark protec-
tion because these marks are inherently distinct).
101. See id. (noting that descriptive marks are not awarded automatic protec-
tion as suggestive marks and that finders-of-fact must distinguish between types of
marks).
102. See id. (laying out three-part test for distinguishing descriptive marks
from suggestive marks).
103. See Shull, supra note 19, at 644 (grouping arbitrary and fanciful marks R
into same category).
104. See Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. San Giacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363,
369 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A] mark qualifies as arbitrary if it is well-known in a differ-
ent context, and fanciful if it is newly invented.”); see also Shull, supra note 18, at R
644 (providing “Apple” is example of arbitrary marks because “it applies a word
that has no particular relation to computers” while “Kodak” exemplifies fanciful
marks because “the term was created for the product”).
105. See Ashley Furniture, 187 F.3d at 369 (stating arbitrary and fanciful marks
receive automatic protection because they are “deemed inherently distinctive”).
106. See Shull, supra note 19, at 643 (stating that trademark owner’s second R
requirement in proving infringement is showing that “infringing use will likely
cause consumer confusion”).
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/10
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS210.txt unknown Seq: 15  7-JUN-13 11:31
2013] FLAG ON THE PLAY 645
that are prevalent in every analysis.107  These factors include: (1)
strength of the mark, (2) proximity of the goods, (3) similarity of
the marks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing chan-
nels used, (6) types of goods and the degree of care likely to be
exercised by the purchaser, (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the
mark, and (8)likelihood of expansion of the product lines.108
In the context of superfans, the team will need to show that
consumers believe that the use of their team’s mark on the
superfan’s merchandise indicates that the team is affiliated with or
sponsored the merchandise.109  One factor that is likely to weigh
against the superfan is the similarity-of-the-marks.110  Usually when
a superfan markets products affiliated with a team, the mark dis-
played is a replica of the team’s logo.111  Additionally, the market-
ing channels used by superfans can support a finding of trademark
infringement.112  When mark holders and superfans reach consum-
ers through the same markets, the likelihood of confusion about
the true source of the goods increases.113
Another factor that many courts emphasize in the likelihood of
confusion analysis is the intent of the defendant.114  In the context
of superfan litigation, defendants have relied on the affirmative de-
fense of their use of a disclaimer to show they did not intend to
deceive consumers.115  However, a recent trend in several circuits
107. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1007 (noting that circuits generally incor- R
porate same eight foundational factors in determining likelihood of confusion).
108. See Shull, supra note 18, at 647 (listing eight factors for likelihood of R
confusion).
109. See Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546 (11th Cir.
1985) (stating confusion “need not relate to the origin of the challenged product.
Rather, ‘confusion’ may relate to the public’s knowledge that the trade-
mark . . . originates with the plaintiff.”).
110. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1008 (noting “similarity-of-the-marks factor R
necessarily supports an inference of likely confusion in the fan apparel context”).
111. See NFL Claims Trademark Infringement, supra note 36 (stating that Saints R
were only trying to stop use of team’s trademark fleur-de-lis logo when used in
combination with team’s other trademarks).
112. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 481 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Smack concedes that the fourth
factor of the analysis [marketing channels used] . . . weighs in favor of a likelihood
of confusion because the Universities’ licensed products are often sold wholesale
to the same retailers who purchase Smack’s products.”).
113. See Gardner, supra note 21, at 722-23 (stating evidence that plaintiff and R
defendant “reach[ed] consumers through the same or comparable markets” in-
creases likelihood of confusion).
114. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1008 (stating that in fan apparel cases, R
courts concentrate on intent of defendant).
115. See id. (noting that use of disclaimers is included in defendant’s intent).
15
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has rendered the use of disclaimers insufficient.116  Currently, there
is a circuit split in regard to the requisite intent.117  While courts
have traditionally required that the defendant intend to confuse
consumers, some circuits now look at whether the defendant in-
tended to profit from a team’s popularity.118  Courts’ interpretation
of intent is critical in sports merchandise cases because this factor
alone is enough to establish likelihood of confusion.119 Addition-
ally, once it is established that a superfan intentionally replicated a
team’s protected mark, the burden of proving that confusion is un-
likely to occur shifts to the superfan.120  In determining the defen-
dant’s intent, courts generally rely on circumstantial evidence such
as the popularity of the mark and similarities and differences be-
tween the defendant’s and plaintiff’s mark.121
This new intent analysis effectively broadens the likelihood of
confusion element, diluting the consumer focus of the Lanham
Act.122  When courts focus on the intent of the defendant to capital-
ize off the team’s popularity, the courts are viewing trademark pro-
tection as a property right.123  This expansive viewpoint is contrary
to the purpose of the Lanham Act because it hinders competition
in the sports merchandise market.124
116. See, e.g., Univ. of Ga. v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (cit-
ing Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1013
(5th Cir. 1975)) (determining that “words which indicate it was not authorized by
the trademark owner are insufficient” to remedy unauthorized use).  For a further
discussion of courts’ dismissal of disclaimers when evaluating likelihood of confu-
sion, see infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text. R
117. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1009 (noting circuit split when it comes to R
interpreting defendant’s intent).
118. See id. (stating how different circuits have interpreted requisite intent).
119. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 481 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] defendant’s intent to confuse
may alone be sufficient to justify an inference that there is a likelihood of
confusion.”).
120. See Gardner, supra note 21, at 724 (stating evidence of intentional simi- R
larities between marks shifts burden to defendant to prove confusion is unlikely).
121. See id. (noting that it is unlikely defendants will admit to intentionally
replicating marks and that courts must consequently rely on circumstantial evi-
dence, and listing types of circumstantial evidence on which courts commonly
rely).
122. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 989 (indicating that trademark law devel- R
oped primarily to protect consumers).  For a further discussion on the intended
consumer-focus of trademark law, see supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. R
123. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1009 (noting focusing on intent to capital- R
ize on team’s popularity is rooted in Boston Professional Hockey, which expanded
trademark protection to confer property rights to mark holder).
124. See id. at 1010 (noting pro-competition goals of trademark law).
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Importantly, actual confusion is not required in finding likeli-
hood of confusion.125  However, where actual confusion is present,
the likelihood of confusion element will generally be met.126  Once
a trademark holder establishes the mark obtained secondary mean-
ing, and the use of the mark caused consumer confusion, the mark
holder has to prove one more element, the functionality
doctrine.127
C. Functionality
In order to receive protection under the Lanham Act, mark
holders must prove the use of their team’s mark does not infringe
on a functional feature.128  A mark will not be afforded trademark
protection when a feature of the product is functional, meaning the
feature “is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it af-
fects the cost or quality of the article.”129  The functionality doc-
trine has two underlying purposes: first, to facilitate competition by
allowing a product’s useful features to be copied, thereby encourag-
ing product advancement, and second, to prohibit an innovator
from securing a monopoly over a product’s useful features.130
Some scholars have argued sports teams’ marks are unable to
receive trademark protection because the logos are an essential
part of fan apparel.131  This argument emphasizes that there is no
substitute for using the team’s logo.132 Thus, a black t-shirt is not an
adequate substitute for one desiring to purchase a navy and white
shirt bearing Cowboy insignia.133  In evaluating the functionality of
125. See Gardner, supra note 21, at 718 (stating actual confusion is not R
necessary).
126. See Alderman v. Iditarod Props., 32 P.3d 373, 392 (Alaska 2001) (holding
that actual confusion provides strong evidence for finding of likely confusion).
127. See Shull, supra note 19, at 643 (listing three requirements needed to R
prove trademark infringement).
128. See Kline, supra note 93, at 54 (stating Lanham Act prohibits registration R
of marks that are functional).
129. Inwood Labs. Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982) (de-
fining “functional” for purposes of Lanham Act).
130. See Shull, supra note 19, at 647-48 (stating purposes of functionality R
doctrine).
131. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1002 (noting scholarly argument that team R
logos are unable to receive trademark protection).
132. See Wilhelm Pudenz v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[T]he functionality doctrine prevents the trademark law from conflicting
with the patent law by eliminating trademark monopolies of potentially unlimited
duration on a product’s utilitarian features.”).
133. See Gerald T. Tschura, Likelihood of Confusion and Expressive Functionality:
A Fresh Look at the Ornamental Use of Institutional Colors, Names and Emblems on Apparel
and Other Goods, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 873, 889 (2007) (noting lack of substitute for
purple sweatshirts bearing LSU).
17
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team logos and insignia, these scholars presuppose the purpose of
sports merchandise is to convey one’s team spirit.134  For further
support of this argument, scholars point to consumers who have
admitted their primary reason for buying their team’s merchandise
is to convey their allegiance.135
Despite these arguments, courts have consistently found the
underlying purpose of sports merchandise is not to function as fan
apparel, but rather to serve a physical purpose.136  In Texas Tech
University v. Spiegelberg, the Fifth Circuit addressed the functionality
of a sports team logo.137  In that case, the Fifth Circuit determined
that the use of the team’s logo on knitted hats did not alter the
hat’s effectiveness at keeping the head warm, which was the func-
tional feature of the merchandise.138  Thus, the court rejected the
argument that the team’s logo and other identifying indicia were
why consumers continued to buy the product.139
IV. THE SUPERFAN’S DEFENSES AGAINST TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
Superfans have several defenses available against claims that
they are “capitalizing” on their teams’ success.140  To prove the ma-
jority of these defenses, the superfan will face an uphill battle given
courts’ current interpretation of trademark protections under the
Lanham Act.141
134. See id. at 874 (“Perhaps, however, warmth is not the essential purpose of
these particular sweaters.  Instead, the expression of the wearer’s allegiance [to
their team] is the essential function.”) (alteration in original).
135. See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 716
(W.D. Pa. 1983) (including testimony by witness who stated, “I imagine people
purchased it [soft goods with Pittsburgh insignia] because they want to express some
type of affinity for the institution.”) (emphasis added).
136. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v.
Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 487 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating Fifth Circuit “has
consistently rejected the concept of aesthetic functionality”).  For a further discus-
sion of the court’s unwillingness to recognize the functionality of team logos, see
infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. R
137. See Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 520 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that use of mark holder’s scarlet and black
color scheme was protected by functionality doctrine).
138. See id. (emphasizing that mere appearance of Texas Tech’s logo on li-
censed goods “does not affect how the product works”).
139. See id. (“[I]t is unclear how one could argue that the mere adding of the
Texas Tech color scheme could be the reason the [product] works”).
140. See Shull, supra note 19, at 652-56 (listing possible trademark defenses). R
141. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for La. St. Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 480 (5th Cir. 2008) (determining t-shirts that stated
“2003 National Champions” constituted infringing use even though shirts did not
bear university’s name).  For a further discussion on the difficulties the superfan
18
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A. Aesthetic Functionality
The first possible defense a superfan can assert arises under
the functionality doctrine.142  Scholars have argued that team logos
are exempt from trademark protection given the functional compo-
nents of fan apparel.143  Aesthetic functionality, a subcategory of
the functionality doctrine, stands to protect against claims of trade-
mark infringement that replicate certain aesthetically pleasing de-
signs in order to effectively compete in the marketplace.144
Aesthetic functionality is invoked only when the mark at issue
provides a significant benefit which cannot be duplicated.145  This
defense turns on whether the design of the mark is the product’s
essential feature and is key to the product’s commercial success.146
Much like the traditional idea of functionality, most courts have re-
jected this argument.147  In doing so, courts have held that unau-
thorized uses of a team’s mark only disadvantages those unable to
use the mark for reputational reasons.148  Moreover, courts have
never upheld reputational-disadvantages as aesthetically
functional.149
faces in defending against a trademark infringement action, see infra notes 142- R
174 and accompanying text. R
142. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1000-06 (noting functionality doctrine has R
sparked much debate in fan apparel trademark infringement cases).
143. See Tschura, supra note 133, at 874 (arguing that “[t]he ornamental use R
of institutional names and insignia on many products, apparel products in particu-
lar, is a functional use of the mark, and therefore, cannot be protected in that
context”).  For a further discussion of the argument that team logos are functional
and should not receive trademark protection, see infra notes 145-149. R
144. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1003 (stating rationale for aesthetic func- R
tionality defense “is that competitors must be able to copy certain aesthetically
pleasing designs to compete effectively”).
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995) (“A de-
sign is “functional” for purposes of the rule stated in §16 if the design affords
benefits. . . that are important to effective competition by others and that are not
practically available through the use of alternative designs.”).
146. See Tschura, supra note 133, at 888 (stating functionality requires that R
aesthetically pleasing design must be essential feature of product).
147. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 487 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Our circuit has consistently re-
jected the concept of aesthetic functionality.”).
148. See id. (“[A]ny demand for Smack’s t-shirts is inextricably tied to the Uni-
versities’ trademarks themselves. . . . Smack’s alleged competitive disadvantage in
the ability to sell game day apparel relates solely to an inability to take advantage of
the Universities’ reputation.”).
149. See Tschura, supra note 133, at 1003 (noting general rule is that “the R
exclusive use of the design must put competitors at a ‘significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage’”).
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B. Disclaimers
Superfans who attempt to sell products bearing their team’s
colors or slogans may be able to avoid trademark infringement
claims by attaching disclaimers to their products.150  Some scholars
have emphasized that when individuals selling team products attach
disclaimers, the likelihood of consumer confusion is eliminated.151
These scholars argue disclaimers alert consumers that they are not
the actual source of the goods.152
Despite the perceived elimination of consumer confusion,
most courts will not take into account disclaimers when evaluating
the likelihood of consumer confusion.153  These courts emphasize
that disclaimers are insufficient in eliminating consumer confusion
when one purposefully copies the protected mark without permis-
sion.154  In finding the use of disclaimers as inadequate, courts once
again illustrate the move toward giving trademark holders a prop-
erty right in their mark, by focusing on the defendant’s intent.155
C. Expressive Use
The superfan also has the option of defending against a claim
of trademark infringement by asserting the doctrine of expressive
use.156  The expressive use defense serves to protect trademark us-
age that conveys a particular message, as opposed to reproduction
150. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1011 (noting that avoiding trademark in- R
fringement by using disclaimers on products depends on facts of specific
situation).
151. See Tschura, supra note 133, at 886 (stating that placing disclaimers on R
sports merchandise eliminates likelihood of confusion, allowing consumers to
make informed decisions).
152. See id. (“If it mattered at all to purchasers, they could simply look to the
presence or absence of the conspicuous ‘officially licensed’ label.”).
153. See Univ. of Ga. v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (dismissing
argument that beer cans bearing disclaimer stating school was not associated with
product eliminated likelihood of confusion).
154. See id. (citing Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,
510 F.2d 1004, 1013 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The exact duplication of the symbol and the
sale as the team’s emblem satisfying the confusion requirement of the law, words
which indicate it was not authorized by the trademark owner are insufficient to
remedy the illegal confusion.”)).
155. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1011 (noting courts who find disclaimers R
insufficient base their holdings on reasoning articulated in Boston Professional
Hockey, which expanded trademark protection conveying property rights to mark
owners).
156. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV.
49, 56-59 (2008) (showing increasing intersection of expressive use with trademark
law).
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/10
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS210.txt unknown Seq: 21  7-JUN-13 11:31
2013] FLAG ON THE PLAY 651
of the protected mark.157  Thus, the defense will only be applicable
to a limited number of cases against the superfan.158  Expressive use
can only be invoked when the trademark is altered or when addi-
tional words or phrases accompany the registered mark.  Accord-
ingly, merchandise containing only the official name of the team is
not covered under expressive use.159  In addition, case law has
shown expressive use will not provide an adequate defense for the
superfan when the merchandise references championship games
the teams have participated in.160
D. Laches and Acquiescence
Even if the aforementioned defenses fail, the superfan can in-
voke the equitable doctrine of laches.161  Laches is recognized when
“a long delay in taking action causes undue prejudice to a defen-
dant.”162  Specifically, laches turns on whether 1) the mark owner
knew of the infringing use; 2) the delayed response of the owner
was unreasonable; and 3) the user of the registered mark was
prejudiced by the owner’s delay in asserting their right.163
Similar to laches is the defense of acquiescence.164  In addition
to the elements of laches, acquiescence requires that the mark
157. See Shull, supra note 19, at 54 (stating “‘[e]xpressive’ uses of trademarks R
convey articulable message rather than, or in addition to, traditional functions of
course identification”).
158. See McGeveran, supra note 156, at 55 (noting by way of example that R
Yankees fans who put Yankee logo on hats are not adding “expressive content or
context”).  When a superfan simply reproduces the trademark, the superfan is not
adding expressive content and therefore is unable to assert this affirmative de-
fense. Id.
159. See id. (stating use of registered marks only qualify as expressive use “if
the trademark[s] were altered to add additional articulable expression”).
160. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. St. Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 480 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding infringing use on t-shirts
which stated “2003 National Champions”).  This shirt was an infringing use even
though it did not bear the mark holder’s name (LSU). Id.
161. See David E. Armendariz, Note, Picking on the Little Guy? Asserting Trade-
mark Rights Against Fans, Emulators, and Enthusiasts?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1259, 1269
(2012) (expressing that trademark owners face equitable doctrine of laches when
they fail to timely enforce their rights against encroaching party).
162. See id. (noting “[w]hile the approach of courts is not always precise or
consistent regarding the impact of a failure to sue infringers, in general, laches is
an equitable defense that may be recognized when a long delay in taking action
causes undue prejudice to a defendant”).
163. See Brittingham v. Jenkins, 914 F.2d 447, 456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Tobacco Workers Int’l Union, Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 958 (4th
Cir. 1971)) (listing elements of laches).
164. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1269 (noting similarity between de- R
fenses of laches and acquiescence).
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holder give consent to the party using the protected mark.165  Con-
sent is generally explicit, but in some cases consent can be inferred
from silence.166  Silence might constitute consent starting when the
trademark holder has actual or constructive knowledge of the de-
fendant’s use of the mark and lasting until the trademark holder
clearly conveys to the defendant that their use of the mark is not
permitted.167
The ability of the superfan to succeed under the defenses of
laches and acquiescence will largely depend on the superfan’s noto-
riety.168  Specifically, the defenses turn on whether the mark holder
knew or consented to the use of their mark.169  Thus, when a
superfan is receiving media coverage it will be easier for the fan to
prove the mark holder knew or consented to the alleged “infring-
ing use.”170
The biggest hurdle for superfans in proving laches and acqui-
escence is asserting they were harmed due to the delay in the mark
holder bringing a claim.171  While it will be hard for a typical fan to
show he or she was harmed by a delay, superfans actively profiting
from merchandise associated with the mark holder’s team will have
less of an issue proving they were unduly prejudiced by the delay.172
165. See id. (stating “active consent” is what differentiates acquiescence).
166. See Molly Buck Richard, Lanham Act—Infringement—Defenses—Acqui-
escence, 3 TEX. PRAC. GUIDE BUS. TRANS. § 16:210 (2012) (stating ways permission
to use mark can be given).
167. See id. (showing period during which silence might constitute
permission).
168. See Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 454 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. Cal. 2006)
(citing Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir.
2000) (indicating that when court examines laches it looks to “when a plaintiff
‘knew or should have known’ of the infringing activity to determine whether the
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing suit.”)).
169. See Brittingham v. Jenkins, 914 F.2d 447, 456 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
laches requires mark holder knew of infringing use) (quoting Tobacco Workers
Int’l Union, Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 958 (4th Cir. 1971)); see
also Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1269 (stating acquiescence requires mark R
holder consented to use).
170. See Avanzado, supra note 5 (noting Clippers have made public statements R
stating that Clipper Darrell has been using Clipper name “over a long period of
time”).
171. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1271 (acknowledging that fans are R
typically not businesses operating to make profits; thus, it is unlikely fans will be
able to show they incurred substantial expenses).
172. See id. (noting fans “are typically not businesses that seek to grow and
expand as a normal business would” – however, those fans who do profit off their
team’s merchandise begin to resemble typical businesses).
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V. BALANCING FANS’ LOVE FOR THEIR TEAM AND THE TEAM’S
INTEREST IN ENFORCING ITS TRADEMARK
When deciding whether to bring trademark infringement ac-
tions against superfans, the teams must first weigh the costs associ-
ated with enforcing their ownership rights against the benefits they
will reap through such enforcement.173  While it may seem that
sports organizations that bring trademark infringement actions are
“picking on the little guys,” these teams have legitimate reasons for
asserting the right to their mark.174
A. Reasons a Professional Sports Team Has for
Protecting Their Mark
1. Profit-Motivation
One reason trademark holders actively assert their rights
against superfans is their desire to reap additional profits.175  When
a superfan markets his or her own products referencing a team, the
superfan diverts profits from the team or mark holder.176  In order
to make more money and allow others to use their mark, teams
frequently enter into licensing agreements with other people or
businesses.177  In 2009, “retail sales of licensed sports merchandise”
totaled $12.5 billion just in the United States.178  Teams eagerly
enter into licensing agreements with parties who want to use the
team’s mark because these agreements allow the team to recapture
a share of the profits.179
173. For a further discussion of the costs and benefits to mark holders in
asserting their rights, see infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text. R
174. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1267 (reflecting that trademark own- R
ers are partly driven to protect against infringement from fans because of fear of
losing protection of their mark).
175. See id. at 1264 (stating trademark holders assert their rights against those
using their mark in order to make more money).
176. See Frank, supra note 24, at 353 (describing free-riding, where trademark R
owners have argued those who use protected marks without paying licensing fees
to mark owners are getting free rides).
177. See Joseph P. Liu, Sports Merchandising, Publicity Rights, and the Missing Role
of the Sports Fan, 52 B.C. L. REV. 493, 495 (2011) (noting professional sports teams
are now deriving “increasingly large amounts of their profits from licensing of
trademarks, trade dress, and rights of publicity”).
178. See Licensed Sports Merchandise is $12.5 Billion Market In U.S./Canada; Major
Leagues Account For 65%, NASCAR For Another 8%, EPM COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
(July 12, 2010), http://www.epmcom.com/public/Licensed_Sports_Merchandise_
Is_125_Billion_Market_In_USCanada_Major_Leagues_Account_For_65_NASCAR
_For_Another_8.cfm (showing amount of sales generated from sports licensing
agreements in 2009).
179. See Michelle L. Evans, Establishing Liability for Breach of Trademark License,
110 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 1 (2012) (stating that “[t]he essence of a trademark
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As professional sports teams have increasingly entered into li-
censing agreements, teams have subsequently become more aggres-
sive in enforcing their rights against unlicensed uses of their
marks.180  In the coming years, it is likely the superfan will bear the
brunt of this increased enforcement.181  While superfans are al-
lowed to enter into licensing agreements with a sports team, they
are unlikely to know they must do so before selling items associated
with the team.182  Compounding this lack of knowledge, teams have
shown an increased willingness to seek legal actions against their
superfans.183  Facing a David-and-Goliath-type battle, superfans are
likely to cease production of the merchandise they are selling upon
receiving word from the team that they are illegally using the team’s
mark.184  Thus, while the team has a legitimate reason in reaping
the profits from their registered mark, it is the superfans, who lack
knowledge concerning licensing agreements, who will face legal ac-
tion from the mark holders.185
2. Fear of Dilution by Tarnishment or Blurring
Another reason trademark holders assert for protecting their
rights is fear of dilution.186  Dilution can occur through both blur-
license agreement is the agreement by the trademark owner to allow a third party
to use its registered trademark in exchange for the third party’s agreement to pay
royalties.”).
180. See generally C.B.G. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ad-
vanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007) (ruling on lawsuit dealing
with unlicensed use of names and information about major league baseball
players).
181. For a further discussion of the increased trademark enforcement against
superfans, see supra notes 51-80 and accompanying text. R
182. See Christopher J. Belter & Joseph M. Hanna, Turning a Playmaker Into a
Moneymaker, 51 DRI FOR DEF. 39 (2009) (indicating that oftentimes multiple li-
censes are required just to produce one item).
183. See, e.g., Baylor Compliance, BAYLOR BEARS, http://www.baylorbears.com/
compliance/cease.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (asking superfans to cease and
desist in relation to their football program and Robert Griffin III); see also Andrew
Sharp, Clipper Darrell, Our Latest Reminder That Donald Sterling Is Horrible, SB NATION
(Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2012/3/1/2834889/clipper-dar-
rell-donald-sterling-embarrassment (stating Clippers have asked Clipper Darrell to
drop Clipper from his name).
184. See Port, supra note 82, at 589 (announcing that trademark holders send R
thousands of cease-and-desist letters, which are almost never prosecuted).
185. See Belter & Hanna, supra note 182, at 39 (stating complexities of enter- R
ing into licensing agreements).
186. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1266 (noting that fear of dilution R
prompts trademark owners to police their marks).
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ring and tarnishment of a team’s mark.187  Dilution by blurring oc-
curs when the superfan’s mark is associated with the team’s
protected mark, thereby diminishing the distinctiveness of the pro-
tected mark.188  In evaluating whether the protected mark is suffi-
ciently recognizable, a court considers a number of factors,
including extent of publicity and volume of sales of goods associ-
ated with the mark.189  In the professional sports context, the mark
is likely to be considered sufficiently recognizable.190  Here, even
though there are numerous different teams in each professional
sports league, the teams receive national attention with a fan base
that is not confined to their particular team’s geographic region.191
Alternatively, dilution by tarnishment occurs when the pro-
tected mark is associated with the superfan’s mark, harming the
protected mark’s reputation.192  This doctrine is most commonly
invoked when one uses a protected mark in conjunction with offen-
sive language or violence.193  Sports teams argue that when offen-
sive phrases are used in connection with their mark, their
reputation is damaged, resulting in a loss of profits amongst other
187. See Frank, supra note 24, at 365-67 (discussing protective doctrines of R
dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment that are available to trademark
holders).
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006) (“‘Dilution by blurring’ is associa-
tion arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”).
189. See id. (“In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of
recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the
mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.  (ii) The
amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under
the mark.  (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.  (iv) Whether the
mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20,
1905, or on the principal register.”).
190. See Hector Saldan˜a, Tall Cowboy Tales, MY SAN ANTONIO (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/entertainment/books/article/Tall-Cowboy-tales-3
899864.php (describing Dallas Cowboy’s star logo as “second only in recognizabil-
ity to that of Coca-Cola.”).
191. See DJ Gallo, Steeler Nation Has Homes Around the Globe, ESPN (Jan. 29,
2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=gallo/090129_steelers
&sportCat=nfl (discussing 1,500 Pittsburgh Steelers sports bars located “across the
nation and around the world.”).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (“‘Dilution by tarnishment’ is association aris-
ing from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark.”).
193. See Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1300 (D. Kan. 2008)
(stating university mark holder brought claims of trademark infringement against
manufacturer who produced t-shirts which bore phrases such as “Kansas Drinking
Team” and “Kansas Co-Ed Naked Beer Pong”).
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things.194  However, in most cases, both dilution by blurring and
dilution by tarnishment are unlikely to pose a serious threat to pro-
fessional sports teams.195  The typical superfan produces only a
small amount of goods, which will be unlikely to reduce the distinc-
tiveness of the mark or harm the sports team’s reputation.196  Nev-
ertheless, where superfans have attained significant notoriety,
dilution by blurring or by tarnishment will become an issue for
mark holders.197
3. Maintaining Rights to Trademark Protection
Finally, trademark holders have an incentive to protect their
rights because failure to do so risks the loss of trademark protec-
tion.198  In order to maintain trademark protection, teams must po-
lice the uses of their mark.199  When enforcing their trademark
rights, teams frequently claim they are acting out of fear of losing
protection, making these actions appear reasonable.200  However,
194. See Saltzman, supra note 21, at 1661 (discussing Bud Light “Fan Can” R
marketing scheme where Bud Light featured color schemes of certain universities,
causing these universities to claim their trademarks were being violated).  There,
the universities were concerned the cans improperly associated their marks with
underage drinking. See id.  After over twenty-five universities sent cease-and-desist
letters the “Fan Can” marketing scheme was pulled. See id.
195. See Frank, supra note 24, at 366 (arguing use of team’s logos on sports R
merchandise will not resulting in blurring because sports logos do not indicate
quality of merchandise).
196. Compare Elegant Designs by Jewls, ETSY,  http://www.etsy.com/shop/ele-
gancebyjewls# (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (listing fan’s four sports bracelets for sale),
with Michael Caruso and Co., Inc. v. Estafan Enters., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1461
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (stating extensive third-party use of “bongo,” which was mark’s
name, had undermined mark’s inherent distinctiveness).  In Michael Caruso,
“bongo” or “bongos” had been incorporated into seventy-five businesses. See id. at
1462.
197. See Sharp, supra note 183 (referring to Clipper Darrell as “probably the R
most famous fan in the NBA”); see also The Case of Clipper Darrell, RULING SPORTS
(Mar. 2, 2012), http://rulingsports.com/2012/03/02/the-case-of-clipper-darrell/
(speculating Clipper’s decision to ask Darrell to remove “Clipper” from his name
most likely stems from their desire to prevent dilution of their trademark).
198. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1267 (describing trademark owners’ R
duty to police use of mark or risk losing its protection).
199. See Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Trademark law requires that the trade-
mark owner police the quality of the goods to which the mark is applied, on pain
of losing the mark entirely.”).
200. See Mark Murphy, Wooden Bat Leagues Faces Splintering Relationship: MLB
Licensing Issue Causes Dilemma for Cape Cod Teams, BOS. HERALD, May 31, 2009, at
b14, available at http://bostonherald.com/sports/baseball/other_mlb/view/2009
_05_31_Wooden_bat_league_faces_splintering_relationship:_MLB_licensing_issue
_causes_dilemma_for_Cape_Cod_teams (stating MLB asked Little League to dis-
continue use of mark for fear of losing their trademark rights).
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in regards to the superfan, these concerns are not as pressing.201
Teams’ fears of losing their marks stem from the superfan’s ability
to invoke the defense of laches and acquiescence.202  However, the
effect of these defenses is limited because injunctive relief is not
barred when the likelihood of confusion is greater than the effect
of a delay.203  In other words, where use of a team’s mark by
superfans creates significant confusion as to the actual source of the
goods, teams will be protected against the equitable defenses of the
superfan. Thus, teams need not worry about over-policing their
rights.204
B. Costs Associated With Enforcing The Team’s Mark
On the other hand, trademark policing is expensive for trade-
mark holders.205  In the superfan context, mark holders will incur
significant costs if they opt to pursue legal action against every
superfan that profits from selling goods associated with their sports
team.206  When sports teams opt to pursue legal action against their
superfans, mark holders will incur the transactional costs of litiga-
tion, sending cease-and-desist letters, and monitoring the use of
their mark.207
Additionally, the most significant, and largely unquantifiable,
cost the mark holder will bear is public backlash.208  When a team
seeks legal action against one of its own fans, the public may view
201. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1268-70 (noting defenses commonly R
invoked by superfans when trademark owners sleep on their rights).
202. For a further discussion of the defenses of laches and acquiescence, see
supra notes 161-170 and accompanying text. R
203. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1270 (suggesting that laches and ac- R
quiescence will not bar injunctive relief “if the likelihood of confusion is great
enough to outweigh the effect of the delay.”).
204. See id. at 1270 (stating trademark rights are not just property rights; thus,
even when faced with equitable defenses of laches and acquiescence, injunctions
may still be granted in favor of consumer’s interests).
205. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV.
2099, 2123 (2004) (outlining two most prevalent costs in enforcing one’s mark:
administrative costs incurred in litigation and error costs incurred by erroneous
outcomes in litigation).
206. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1276 (stating that in addition to typi- R
cal costs faced by trademark owners protecting their mark, actions taken against
superfans also risk loss of goodwill and public backlash).
207. See id. at 1276 (listing transactional costs of policing one’s registered
mark); see also Port, supra note 82, at 589 (describing prevalence of cease-and-desist R
letters and filings required to pursue trademark infringement claims).
208. See, e.g., Avanzado, supra note 5 (reporting on Clippers players’ support R
for superfan Darrell).  For a further discussion of the public backlash against the
Clippers’ termination of its relationship with Darrell, see supra note 11 and accom- R
panying text.
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the team as “money-hungry” and only out for themselves.209  This
negative backlash can potentially lead to decreased sales for the
team.210  Sports teams derive a significant amount of revenue from
ticket sales and other team merchandise; thus, teams need fan sup-
port to succeed financially.211
C. Fans’ Interest in Being Able To Use Their Team’s Mark
Superfans’ primary interest in using their team’s mark is to ex-
press their love for their team.212  Superfans frequently buy tickets
to games and purchase various other products associated with their
team.213  The typical superfan spends more money accumulating
items associated with his or her team than he or she will receive in
selling goods bearing the team’s mark.214  Additionally, players and
coaches alike frequently attribute their team’s success to their fans’
enthusiasm.215  Thus, the relationship between the superfan and
the professional sports team is not one-sided; rather, it is a symbi-
otic relationship.216  Accordingly, because the team/mark holder
attributes some of its success to the superfan, it is appropriate to
209. See Can LA Clippers Use Trademark Law To Stop Clipper Darrell?, MILORD &
ASSOCIATES (Feb. 29, 2012) http://www.iptrademarkattorney.com/2012/02/los-
angeles-clippers-basketball-clipper-darrel-bailey-fan-estoppel-laches.html (advising
Clippers to license Clipper Darrell in order to avoid risk of alienating their fans).
210. See Wayne DeSarbo, Avid Sports Fans’ Passion for the Team Often Translates
Into Revenue, PENN STATE SMEAL COLL. OF BUS., http://research.smeal.psu.edu/
news/avid-sports-fans2019-passion-for-the-team-often-translates-into-revenue (last
visited Oct. 7, 2012) (advocating that revenue generated in sports industry is pri-
marily attributed to fans).
211. See Glen Hodgson & Mario Lefebvre, Why Pro Sports Franchises Succeed . . .
and Fail, THE CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA (Sept. 2011), http://www.conference
board.ca/reports/briefings/bigleagues/briefing-8.aspx  (listing lack of fan sup-
port as one of main reasons why some professional sports franchises have failed).
212. See Jeff Pearlman, Sports Fans Are Passionate, But Many Need a Dose of Per-
spective, SI.COM (Aug. 6, 2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/jeff
_pearlman/08/06/angry.fans/index.html (presenting passion and love that sports
fans have for their favorite teams).
213. See 2011 NFL Football Attendance, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/attend-
ance/_/year/2011 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (reporting on average 78,685 fans
attended Dallas Cowboys game during 2011 season).
214. See Jesse Dorsey, Clipper Darrell and the 11 Biggest Super-Fans in the NBA,
BLEACHER REPORT, Sept. 8, 2012, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1326769-
clipper-darrell-and-the-11-biggest-super-fans-in-the-nba/page/8 (noting superfan
Nav Bhatia has attended over 500 games and buys thousands of seats to his team’s
games every year).
215. See Yak Attributes Success To Hard Work, Fans’ Support, COMPLETE SPORTS
(Aug. 25, 2012), http://completesportsnigeria.com/news/2012/08/yak-attributes-
success-to-hard-work-fans-support (reporting that professional soccer player attrib-
uted his success to training as well as his fans’ support).
216. See id. (noting contributions of superfan).
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allow the superfan leeway to produce his or her own “team”
products.217
D. Possible Solutions
Considering the possible liability professional sports teams
face, superfans should be limited in their ability to profit from team
merchandise sales.218  While it is not easy to draw a bright line be-
tween acceptable superfan profits and impermissible uses of a pro-
tected mark, a standard is needed to guide superfans’ expressions
of enthusiasm for their teams.219
In maintaining a suitable balance between the interests of
teams and superfans, courts should return to the underlying pur-
pose of trademark law: consumer protection.220  Primarily, this will
require courts to narrow the likelihood of confusion standard.221
Once courts shift their focus from protecting the property rights of
mark holders, disclaimers will adequately address consumer confu-
sion.222  Additionally, when superfans use their team’s mark, they
should be required to attach a disclaimer to remove any consumer
confusion in the marketplace.223  Moreover, when analyzing the
likelihood of confusion in regards to a team’s color schemes, courts
should concisely define “other-identifying-indicia.”224  Without a
recognized meaning regarding this standard, teams are effectively
granted a monopoly over the use of their color schemes, and
217. For a further discussion on the extent of leeway superfans should be
afforded, see infra notes 218-238 and accompanying text. R
218. For a further discussion of the adverse consequences a sports team faces
upon failure to protect their rights, see supra notes 175-204 and accompanying R
text.
219. See University of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1300 (D. Kan. 2008)
(holding some of shirts at issue constituted trademark infringement while other
shirts were not substantially similar to protected mark falling outside of trademark
protection).  The jury found that while T-shirts bearing the phrase “Kansas Drink-
ing Team” were infringing, T-shirts which stated “Kansas Co-ed Naked Beer Pong”
did not invoke similar protection. See id.
220. See Mitten, supra note 25, at 905 (stating traditional rationale for trade- R
mark law was consumer protection).
221. See Franklin, supra note 17, at 1009 (noting expansion of likelihood of R
confusion has shifted focus onto protecting property rights of trademark holders).
222. See Tschura, supra note 133, at 886 (expressing how disclaimers help to R
eliminate consumer confusion).
223. For a further discussion of how disclaimers eliminate confusion, see
supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. R
224. See Saltzman, supra note 21, at 1649 (explaining lack of boundaries in R
defining what constitutes “color-plus-other-identifying-indicia.”).
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superfans are left susceptible to unknowingly committing trade-
mark infringement.225
In evaluating a mark’s functionality, courts should recognize
that for most consumers, sports merchandise functions to convey
their allegiance to their team.226  When a mark is serving this func-
tion, the mark is not entitled to trademark protection.227  In order
to support the idea that sports apparel functions to convey a fan’s
love for a team, courts could rely on survey evidence collected from
those who have purchased sports merchandise.228
From a policy perspective, allowing superfans to make and
market their own versions of their team’s gear furthers the competi-
tive aims of the functionality doctrine.229  When multiple produc-
ers, including fans, are able to present consumers with a variety of
choices of a particular product, consumers are able to decide on
the quality of product they wish to purchase.230  These pro-competi-
tive aims allow the consumer to choose the quality of goods that
they wish to purchase at a desirable price.231  Consumers who can
purchase a product at a lower price and who are presented with a
wide array of products are more apt to purchase their team’s mer-
chandise.232  An increase in the purchasing of team apparel, even if
a portion of the merchandise is being purchased from superfans,
225. For a further discussion of how the lack of defining “other-identifying-
indicia” hinders a superfan’s ability to incorporate their team’s color scheme, see
supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. R
226. See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 716
(W.D. Pa. 1983) (detailing testimony of witness who admitted fans are propelled to
buy sports merchandise due to allegiance to one’s team).
227. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982)
(finding trademark protection cannot be granted when feature of product “is es-
sential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article.”).
228. See Nat’l Football League Prop. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 651, 657 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (finding through use of survey evidence that
around half of consumers thought that NFL or individual team authorization was
required for replicas).
229. See Shull, supra note 19, at 648 (stating functionality doctrine serves to R
facilitate competition and also prohibits people from gaining monopoly power
over product’s useful features).
230. See Peter E. Mims, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Eco-
nomic Model of Trademarks, 63 TEX. L. REV. 639, 665 (1984) (discussing that when
trademark owners are allowed to monopolize products bearing their mark, costs of
products increase leaving consumers without variety of choices).
231. See Mitten, supra note 25, at 928 (indicating when professional sports R
teams exercise exclusive control over team’s mark, consumers are presented with
fewer choices at higher retail prices).
232. See Price and Competition in Food Markets, USC MARHSALL, http://www.con-
sumerpsychologist.com/food_Price_and_Competition.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2012) (concluding consumers will buy more goods when price is lower).
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will nevertheless benefit the team/mark holder.233  Availability of
team merchandise allows the community to feel a stronger connec-
tion to its team, spurring additional consumption.234
Finally, a regulation system needs to be created to ensure that
superfans are able to enter the sports apparel market.235  This sys-
tem would monitor and track cease-and-desist letters sent by trade-
mark holders.236  It would also prevent teams from sending cease-
and-desist letters to any superfan who used or made reference to
their mark, regardless of the likelihood of confusion.237  For in-
stance, upon receiving a cease-and-desist letter, the superfan would
have the option to forward this letter, along with the merchandise
at issue, to an oversight organization.  While this system would ini-
tially be costly, over time the need for a regulatory system would
subside.  This system would deter teams from sending frivolous let-
ters and simultaneously educate superfans about what uses consti-
tutes infringement.238
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the years trademark protection under the Lanham Act
has expanded, affording trademark holders more protection.  It is
consumers who will ultimately pay the price of this increased expan-
sion, which works towards granting mark holders a monopoly over
the sports merchandise market.  Monopoly power in the hands of
professional sports teams will drive the costs of sports merchandise
up, and leave consumers with a lack of choices among products.
Even though sports teams have a right to protect their mark, they
should not unreasonably exercise this right against superfans who
receive only a small profit from their devotion and love for their
team.239  Trademark holders who bring legal action against their
superfans not only stand to lose the costs associated with litigation,
233. See Tschura, supra note 133, at 874 (emphasizing underlying importance R
of team apparel by stating that “the expression of the wearer’s allegiance [to the
team] is the essential function [of sports apparel].”).
234. See id. (reporting that effects that team merchandise in general has in
conveying love for one’s team).
235. See id. (noting objective of strike suits is to raise cost of market entrance).
236. See Port, supra note 82, at 589 (discussing how trademark holders send R
mass amounts of cease-and-desist letters so frequently they have “sample” letters).
237. See id. (noting that if most of these letters and claims were pursued, they
would likely fail because they are frequently based on unmeritorious claims).
238. See Armendariz, supra note 161, at 1276 (expressing costs associated with R
sending cease-and-desist letters and other legal filings).
239. See CD Apparel, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF CLIPPER DARRELL, http://clipper
darrell.com/cdapparel/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (displaying items for sale rang-
ing from one to thirteen dollars).
31
Adams: Flag on the Play: Professional Sports Teams Calling Trademark Inf
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS210.txt unknown Seq: 32  7-JUN-13 11:31
662 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 631
but more importantly, the support of those who relentlessly devote
their time and money to their favorite team.240
Jennifer M. Adams*
240. For a further discussion of public backlash as a result of teams pursuing
legal action against their superfans, see supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Villanova University School of Law; B.A.,
Bucknell University, 2011.
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